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The More Copyright Laws
Change, the More Digital
Challenges Stay the Same
Peter K. Yu*

Introduction
I first met Professor Jan Rosén at an annual congress of the International Association for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in
Intellectual Property (ATRIP). He is not only an elder statesman in
the field of intellectual property law, but also one of the organization’s earliest members – a fact he has proudly acknowledged, often
with an interesting backstory. During 2009–2011, he served as
ATRIP’s president, hosting many of us in a highly memorable congress at Stockholm University while also leading an equally successful congress in Singapore the following year.
In the past few years, I have also worked with Professor Rosén
through The WIPO Journal, which I edit. Since the journal’s founding in fall 2009, he has served on its editorial advisory board. I have
also worked with him as well as with other past ATRIP presidents
on a special issue commemorating the association’s 30th anniversary.
It has always been a pleasure to work with him. More enjoyably, he
constantly provides support and encouragement – regardless of
whether you are his peer or a mere junior academic.

*

Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Law and Intellectual Property, Texas
A&M University School of Law.
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Professor Rosén has contributed many important ideas to the
copyright field. He not only provides unique insights into Nordic
copyright law – Swedish copyright law, in particular – he has also
worked tirelessly to support young scholars in the field. It is with this
objective that he, along with Professor Gustavo Ghidini, launched
the annual ATRIP Essay Contest – which he continues to run, with
amazing success.1 Since its establishment in 2007, the contest has
featured cutting-edge scholarship from junior intellectual property
scholars from around the world. For the ATRIP Intellectual Property Series, a book series published by Edward Elgar Publishing, he
also edited two volumes collecting articles written by both emerging
and veteran scholars.2
Although this short essay will in no way be able to capture the
many contributions Professor Rosén has provided to the intellectual
property field, I highlight below two areas into which his scholarship
have offered unique and important insights. Specifically, I focus on
topics that have been explored in his English-language publications.
The first topic concerns the exhaustion of distribution rights in
computer software and other digital works. The second topic covers
the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression. Both topics remain timely and relevant. Indirectly, they also suggest the
enduring impact of Professor Rosén’s scholarship.

Exhaustion of Distribution Rights
In 1995, Professor Rosén published Swedish Software Law: As
Related Primarily to EC Directives, immediately after Sweden joined
the European Union and shortly after the adoption of Directive 91/
250 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (Software
Directive).3 This monograph explains in detail the Swedish legal

1
2

3

Annette Kur and Jan Rosén, ‘ATRIP and Publications’ (2013) 4 WIPO J 269, 273–
74.
Jan Rosén (ed), Individualism and Collectiveness in Intellectual Property Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2012); Jan Rosén (ed), Intellectual Property at the
Crossroads of Trade (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2012).
Jan Rosén, Swedish Software Law: As Related Primarily to EC Directives (Stockholm:
Juristförlaget 1995).
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regime for the protection of intellectual property rights in computer
programs.
The first section of the book highlights the challenge of fitting
computer programs into the usual category of ‘literary works’ – a
debate that was once intense and that has raised questions about the
need for a sui generis regime for computer software. The book then
describes the copyright regime for computer programs, covering
topics that range from the object and scope of protection to
restricted acts and exceptions. The section concludes with a brief
discussion of two sets of special issues: (1) video games, computer art
and screen displays; and (2) electronic data banks and compilations.
The second set of issues is especially important to those studying
international copyright law: the Nordic ‘catalogue rule’ is not only
highly distinctive, but has inspired the development of sui generis
database protection in the European Union.
The second section of the book explores the protection of a wide
variety of industrial property rights in computer programs. These
rights include patents, chip protection, unfair competition, title
protection, trademarks and trade secrets and know-how. The third
section discusses issues relating to computer contracts, which range
from sales to maintenance and from back-up and escrow to competition law. The final section explores the contractual, tortious and
criminal liability in cases involving computer programs as well as the
different evidentiary questions that could be raised in these cases.
Taken together, these four sections have provided a comprehensive treatise on Swedish software law. Although the book was published in the mid-1990s, it is still highly relevant today. For junior
scholars, the book’s structure also provides deep insight into how a
complex topic can be thoroughly examined. As Professor Rosén has
shown, software protection cannot be pigeon-holed into the category of either author’s right or industrial right. Instead, such protection provides a paradigmatic example of what commentators have
now referred to as ‘overlapping rights’.4
In today’s copyright debate, issues relating to software protection
still come up repeatedly, especially in relation to digital works. One
4

Estelle Derclaye and Matthias Leistner, Intellectual Property Overlaps: A European
Perspective (Oxford: Hart Publishing 2011); Neil J Wilkof and Shamnad Basheer,
Overlapping Intellectual Property Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012).
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issue that has recently caught considerable attention concerns the
exhaustion of distribution rights in computer programs and other
digital works. Although the first sale doctrine in copyright law
allows the owner of a lawful copy of the copyrighted work to ‘sell or
otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy’,5 that owner may
not do so if the protected content is disseminated under a license, as
opposed to sold as a good.
More interestingly, as far as Swedish copyright law is concerned,
the first sale doctrine is not just limited to sale. As Professor Rosén’s
book explains:
“[T]he exhaustion of the distribution rights in a copy of a computer program, which also includes preparatory design material,
is effectuated by all kinds of final transfers. Hereby, not only
actual sale of a copy, but also barter and gift are comprised by
what is called ‘överlåtelse’ in Section 19 of the [Swedish Copyright] Act. Consequently, copies of programs given away free of
charge, e.g. for marketing purposes, execute exhaustion just as
sale on the basis of full economic compensation, provided of
course that those acts are performed with the consent of the
author or his rightholder. Therefore, this exhaustion rule comprises not only the first sale doctrine of Article 4(c) of the [Software] Directive, but goes somewhat further.”6

Indeed, the term ‘överlåtelse’ has raised interesting questions in not
only the exhaustion context but also the licensing context. After all,
the Swedish Copyright Act ‘uses the word “överlåtelse” for all kinds
of transfer of rights, whether final, total or limited’.7
In July 2012, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) decided the case of UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp.8 At issue were the software licenses that UsedSoft had purchased from Oracle’s customers and then resold to third
parties. These licenses involved Oracle’s computer programs that
had been licensed to and paid for by its customers. Concerned about

5
6
7
8

17 USC s 109(a) (2012).
Rosén (n 3) 32.
Ibid 73.
Case C-128/11 UsedSoft GmbH v Oracle International Corp. (3 July 2012).

898

The More Copyright Laws Change, the More Digital Challenges Stay the Same

the potential loss of revenue, Oracle challenged UsedSoft’s practice
by claiming that the resale of ‘used’ software licenses violated the
rights to reproduce and distribute its copyrighted software.
Rejecting Oracle’s arguments, the Grand Chamber found that
‘the transfer by the copyright holder to a customer of a copy of a
computer program, accompanied by the conclusion between the
same parties of a user licence agreement, constitute[d] a “first sale …
of a copy of a program” within the meaning of Article 4(2) of [the
Software] Directive’.9 As the court explained: ‘It makes no difference
… whether the copy of the computer program was made available
to the customer by the rightholder concerned by means of a download from the rightholder’s website or by means of a material
medium such as a CD-ROM or DVD’.10 The only requirement is
that the original owner has ‘ma[d]e the copy downloaded onto his
computer unusable at the time of its resale’.11
UsedSoft stood in sharp contrast to a very recent CJEU case, Art
& Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright.12 This case concerned the sale of physical canvases incorporating without authorisation the licensed copyrighted reproductions of works of famous
painters, which were transferred from paper posters to canvases
through an industrial process. Like UsedSoft, this case was about the
exhaustion of the distribution right. Unlike the previous case, however, Allposters did not concern the Software Directive, but rather
Directive 2001/29 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society (Infosoc
Directive).
In the end, the CJEU seemed to have somewhat backtracked
from its earlier position. Deciding Allposters less than three years
after UsedSoft, the Court declared:
[T]he rule of exhaustion of the distribution right set out in Article 4(2) of [the Infosoc] Directive … does not apply in a situation
where a reproduction of a protected work, after having been mar-

9

Ibid [48].
Ibid [47].
11 Ibid [78].
12 Case C-419/13 Art & Allposters International BV v Stichting Pictoright (22 January 2015).
10
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keted in the European Union with the copyright holder’s consent, has undergone an alteration of its medium, such as the
transfer of that reproduction from a paper poster onto a canvas,
and is placed on the market again in its new form.13

Although this case involved an alteration of the medium used and
covered physical goods, rather than digital works, it remains unclear
what implications the ruling will have on the digital exhaustion
issue, especially in controversies involving the Infosoc Directive, as
opposed to the Software Directive.
The European Union is not the only jurisdiction actively addressing digital exhaustion. Similar questions have been explored in the
United States. For example, ‘[s]everal federal courts have held that
the first sale doctrine does not apply to software users who have
licensed the software, because they have not acquired title to a particular copy’.14 Bruce Willis also famously lamented his inability to
leave his legally purchased iTunes tracks to his children, due both to
the legal distinction between a sale and a license and to the iTunes’
restrictive terms of service.15
The leading US case in the digital exhaustion context is Capitol
Records, LLC v ReDigi Inc.16 In this case, a record company sued
ReDigi for copyright infringement based on its provision of a virtual
marketplace for Internet users to sell pre-owned digital music. Once
the music is sold, ReDigi’s software will erase the resold iTunes
tracks from the seller’s computer while simultaneously transmitting
the resold tracks to ReDigi’s cloud lockers.
Of particular interest is the court’s consideration of ‘whether a
digital music file, lawfully made and purchased, may be resold by its
owner through ReDigi under the first sale doctrine’.17 The court
answered in the negative:

13

Ibid [50].
Joseph P Liu, ‘Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy
Ownership’ (2001) 42 William and Mary L Rev 1245, 1290.
15 Brandon Griggs, ‘Can Bruce Willis Leave His iTunes Music to His Kids?’ http://
www.cnn.com/2012/09/03/tech/web/bruce-willis-itunes/ accessed 11 January 2015.
16 Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi Inc 934 F Supp 2d 640 (SDNY 2013).
17 Ibid 648.
14
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[T]he first sale doctrine does not protect ReDigi’s distribution of
Capitol’s copyrighted works. This is because, as an unlawful
reproduction, a digital music file sold on ReDigi is not ‘lawfully
made under this title.’ Moreover, the statute protects only distribution by ‘the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord … of
that copy or phonorecord.’ Here, a ReDigi user owns the phonorecord that was created when she purchased and downloaded a
song from iTunes to her hard disk. But to sell that song on
ReDigi, she must produce a new phonorecord on the ReDigi
server. Because it is therefore impossible for the user to sell her
‘particular’ phonorecord on ReDigi, the first sale statute cannot
provide a defense.18

Although the court eventually found for the plaintiff record company, its ruling may not apply well to ReDigi’s upgraded software
and platform, which now deploys cloud lockers to avoid generating
new copies in the act of sale and transfer.19
Given the rapid evolution of digital technology and the proliferation of business models seeking to take advantage of this evolution,
the digital exhaustion issue is likely to continue to raise questions in
the copyright debate. Professor Rosén’s book was published two decades before this particular issue arose, yet his analysis of Swedish
software law has provided interpretive guidance on both the scope
of the EU Software Directive and the interplay between the Directive and national copyright laws.

Copyright and Freedom of Expression
The second topic that has attracted Professor Rosén’s attention in his
English-language publications concerns the daunting challenge of
balancing the interests implicated by copyright law and the protection of freedom of expression. In ‘Copyright and Freedom of
Expression in Sweden – Private Law in a Constitutional Context’, a
chapter in a copyright law handbook, he introduces the Swedish

18
19

Ibid 655.
Péter Mezei, ‘The Theory of Functional Equivalence and Digital Exhaustion – An
Almost Concurring Opinion to the UsedSoft v. Oracle Decision’ ssrn.com/
abstract=2496876 accessed 11 January 2015.
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experience, which he finds uniquely positioned to provide insight
into how courts should address this challenge.20
As Professor Rosén points out, freedom of expression is ‘constitutionally stronger in Sweden than possibly in any other country in the
world’.21 Interestingly, the rights of authors, artists and photographers are also explicitly recognised in the Government Form
(Regeringsformen) of 1974.22 As he observes:
It is quite striking that no other country within the EU seems to
be able to demonstrate more profound constitutional support for
copyright or, rather, authors’ rights, than Sweden, namely via the
Government Form of 1974 … which replaced that of 1809,
where copyright’s relation to freedom of expression is actually
clarified by reference to a number of norms found in the Fundamental Freedom of the Press Act … of 1949 and the Fundamental Law on the Freedom of Expression … of 1992, the latter being
drafted for the protection of modern electronic media, broadcasting included.23

Mass media is indeed an area in which conflicts between copyright
and freedom of expression are prone to arise. A notable case involving this type of conflict is Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd.24
Decided by the Court of Appeal of England and Wales in July 2001,
this case concerned the publication by the Sunday Telegraph of the
then-unpublished minute of a secret meeting between Liberal Democrats leader Paddy Ashdown and Prime Minister Tony Blair shortly
after the 1997 UK general elections.
In this case, Ashdown sued the newspaper for breach of confidence and copyright infringement. In its defence, the newspaper
invoked fair dealing and public interest as well as a novel argument
based on the newly enacted Human Rights Act 1998. As the news-

20

21
22
23
24

Jan Rosén, ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Sweden – Private Law in a
Constitutional Context’ in Paul Torremans (ed), Copyright Law: A Handbook of
Contemporary Research (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing 2007).
Ibid 355.
Professor Rosén, however, reminds us that ‘[t]he word “copyright” (‘upphovsrätt’)
is not used in the’ Government Form. Ibid 365.
Ibid 364.
Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 1142.
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paper contended, the new statute, which incorporated into British
law the protection of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, established ‘a new “freedom of expression” exception to copyright law in addition to the
existing statutory exceptions’.25
At trial, the Chancery Division rejected the newspaper’s human
rights defence (as well as its two other usual defences). As ViceChancellor Sir Andrew Morritt explained:
The balance between the rights of the owner of the copyright and
those of the public has been struck by the legislative organ of the
democratic state itself in the legislation it has enacted. There is
no room for any further defences outside the code which establishes the particular species of intellectual property in question.26

The court granted a summary judgment on the copyright claim,
awarding Lord Ashdown both an injunction on further infringement and a choice of remedy of either damages or an account of
profits.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals provided a lengthier and more
nuanced analysis of the impact of the new Human Rights Act on
copyright protection. As the court elaborated, intellectual property
rights may sometimes conflict with human rights:
Freedom of expression protects the right both to publish information and to receive it. There will be occasions when it is in the
public interest not merely that information should be published,
but that the public should be told the very words used by a person, notwithstanding that the author enjoys copyright in them.
On occasions, indeed, it is the form and not the content of a document which is of interest.27

25

Michael D Birnhack, ‘Acknowledging the Conflict between Copyright Law and
Freedom of Expression under the Human Rights Act’ [2003] Entertainment L Rev
24, 26.
26 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] Ch 685, 696.
27 Ashdown v Telegraph Group Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ at 1142.
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To avoid the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression,
the court stated, in dicta, that discretionary injunctive relief should
be declined. As Lord Chief Justice Nicholas Phillips explained:
If a newspaper considers it necessary to copy the exact words created by another, we can see no reason in principle why the newspaper should not indemnify the author for any loss caused to
him, or alternatively account to him for any profit made as a
result of copying his work. Freedom of expression should not
normally carry with it the right to make free use of another’s
work.28

By making this recommendation, the Court of Appeals opened the
possibility for fair remuneration, or even the creation of a human
rights-based compulsory license.29 Nevertheless, because the appellant did not challenge the appropriateness of injunctive relief, the
court did not further review the discretion exercised by the lower
court. After concluding that the newspaper had infringed on Lord
Ashdown’s copyright in the reproduced minute, the court dismissed
the appeal.
The conflict between copyright and freedom of expression is particularly important in today’s Internet age when individual users
actively participate in the creative process, producing what policy
makers and commentators generally refer to as ‘user-generated content’. Thanks to the unprecedented ability provided by the Internet
to develop this content, ‘[e]veryone – not just political, economic,
or cultural elites – [now has] a fair chance to participate in the production of culture, and in the development of the ideas and meanings that constitute them and the communities and subcommunities to which they belong’.30
Given the internet’s immense potential for freedom and empowerment, it is no surprise that a US judge called the media ‘the most
participatory form of mass speech yet developed’ in the early days of
28

Ibid.
On the ‘just remuneration’ approach and human rights-based compulsory licenses,
see Peter K Yu, ‘Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human
Rights Framework’ (2007) 40 UC Davis L Rev 1039, 1095–1105.
30 Jack M Balkin, ‘Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of
Expression for the Information Society’ (2004) 79 New York U L Rev 1, 4–5.
29
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the World Wide Web.31 In a recent report, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression also described the Internet as ‘one of the
most powerful instruments of the 21st century for increasing transparency in the conduct of the powerful, access to information, and
for facilitating active citizen participation in building democratic
societies’.32
As far as the debate on the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression is concerned, judges, legislators, policy makers
and commentators have relied heavily on the built-in safeguards,
limitations and exceptions within the copyright system to explain
away the conflict. An oft-cited supporting statement comes from US
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor: ‘[I]t should not be
forgotten that the Framers [of the US Constitution] intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression.’33 This statement was
made in Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises, a case
involving the unauthorised publication of carefully chosen quotations from President Gerald Ford’s then-unpublished memoirs.
Although Justice O’Connor’s rather conclusory statement has
been frequently cited as if the support it provides would magically
resolve the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression, a
close inspection of the statement reveals that Justice O’Connor actually did not take any view on whether the copyright system, especially the one existing today, serves as an ‘engine of free expression’.
Instead, her focus was primarily on the intent of the framers of the
US Constitution – intent that may not always have a universal
appeal.
More importantly, Harper & Row included an oft-overlooked dissent, in which Justice William Brennan responded directly to Justice
O’Connor: ‘The copyright laws serve as the “engine of free expression” only when the statutory monopoly does not choke off multifarious indirect uses and consequent broad dissemination of information and ideas’.34 Thus, even if we agree with Justice O’Connor

31

Reno v ACLU 929 F Supp 824, 883 (ED Pa 1996).
Frank La Rue, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression’ (2011) A/HRC/17/27 at [2].
33 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc v Nation Enterprises (1985) 471 US 539, 558.
34 Ibid 589.
32
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that the copyright system was originally intended to serve as an
engine of free expression, we still need to explore whether the existing system, along with the upward adjustments now demanded by
the copyright industries, would fulfil this intended goal. We also
need to evaluate whether the system and the proposed adjustments
would ‘choke off multifarious indirect uses and consequent broad
dissemination of information and ideas’ – a key concern of Justice
Brennan.
Although Professor Rosén, like Justice O’Connor, recognises that
‘copyright is the engine of free expression’,35 he is less ready to dismiss the potential conflict between copyright and freedom of expression. As he writes:
The conflict is just as overt, as one person’s right to express himself must, per definition, be limited by another person’s copyright
in the very form which is used for a public speech. If someone in
his public address wants to expose someone else’s expression there
is inevitably a conflict between his right to express himself and
the rights in what is expressed or, rather, the forms of what is
expressed.36

To help address this conflict, Professor Rosén invites us to explore
the Swedish experience – in particular, how Swedish courts have
legally resolved the tension and conflict between copyright and freedom of expression.
The approach taken by Swedish courts is not only insightful, but
also brings to mind the inevitable challenge posed by the competing
interests recognised in Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and Article 15(1) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Although both provisions
protect the rights to ‘take part in cultural life’ and to ‘enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’, they also recognise
the right to ‘the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or
she] is the author’.

35
36

Rosén (n 20) 355.
Ibid.
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Because copyright law offers protection to these interests, the
conflict between copyright and freedom of expression can be largely
seen as an internal conflict within the human rights regime – at least
with respect to those aspects of copyright that have human rights
bases.37 Thus, instead of taking a categorical approach in which fundamental rights will immediately trump private law, courts need to
take a more nuanced approach to avoid the tension and conflict
between copyright and freedom of expression.
This nuanced approach was the one to which Professor Rosén’s
discussion of the Swedish experience has guided us. As he concludes
in his book chapter:
So far, the [Swedish] courts have chosen … to try copyright cases
within [a framework that] test[s] its own ‘internal’ build-up, its
own built-in balancing of informational interests and, generally,
freedom of expression. On those rare occasions when a conflict
between copyright and freedom of expression and information is
observable – without it being factually tested by a court capable
of offering a decision that may form a precedent – the courts have
chosen to reason on the possibility of non-punishment for violation of copyright, i.e. not a setting aside of basic copyright values,
even in those atypical situations when the question is at all relevant. This attitude seems to offer quite congruent factual results
from courts throughout Europe, to seek a solution to the conflict
between copyright and freedom of expression within the former’s
internal construction. A tendency of this kind seems to flourish
also among countries that do not offer copyright as strong a constitutional dimension as Sweden does.38

37

On the importance of distinguishing between the human rights and non-human
rights aspects of intellectual property rights, see Peter K Yu, ‘Digital Copyright
Enforcement Measures and Their Human Rights Threats’ in Christophe Geiger
(ed), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Intellectual Property (Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 459–62; Peter K Yu, ‘Intellectual Property and
Human Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era’ (2012) 64 Florida L Rev 1045, 1061–62.
38 Rosén (n 20) 372.

907

Peter K. Yu

Conclusion
From Stockholm University to ATRIP to the Association Littéraire
et Artistique Internationale (ALAI), Professor Rosén has contributed many insightful and enduring ideas about intellectual property
law. Although this short essay does not capture all of these important
contributions, it seeks to show the long-lasting and continued
impact of Professor Rosén’s scholarship in the copyright field.
In the decades since Professor Rosén started teaching, writing and
conducting research, the copyright debate has changed dramatically
– through the introduction of new laws, new technologies, new
business models and new social practices. Yet, deep down, the debate
has changed surprisingly very little: it is still about how to strike the
balance between proprietary control and authorial protection on the
one hand and public access and individual self-expression on the
other. As an unauthorised derivative work of Jean-Baptiste Alphonse
Karr’s famous epigram would declare, ‘The more copyright laws
change, the more digital challenges stay the same’.
Today, judges, legislators, policy makers and commentators continue to address questions Professor Rosén explored years or decades
ago. That they still do so shows the continued relevance and enduring impact of his scholarship. This is indeed why we are so thankful
that he has put his insights down in writing for the benefit of all of
us working in the copyright field. His ideas will have a major impact
for generations to come, and it is an immense privilege for me to
join others in celebrating his long and fruitful career.
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